Suchergebnisse

The paper presents the results of a quantitative survey of the perception of the readiness of state administration and local governments, households and citizens to react in crises caused by floods in the Republic of Serbia. Starting from the theory of readiness as the framework for explaining the way in which the community changes with regard to the implementation of certain preventive measures, the impact of certain demographic, socio-economic and psychological characteristics of citizens on their perception of the readiness of the mentioned subjects of the protection and rescue system is examined. The objective of quantitative research is the scientific explanation of the impact of these factors on the perception of readiness. Starting from the empirically not tested state of perception of the readiness of the protection and rescue system for reaction, this paper has the scientific and social significance. Furthermore, research results can be used to improve the readiness of such system. ; U radu su izneti rezultati kvantitativnog istraživanja percepcije pripremljenosti organa državne uprave i jedinica lokalne samouprave, domaćinstva i građana za reagovanje u kriznim situacijama izazvanim poplavama u Republici Srbiji. Polazeći od teorije pripremljenosti kao okvira za objašnjenje načina na koji se zajednica menja u pogledu sprovođenja određenih preventivnih mera ispituje se uticaj određenih demografskih, socio-ekonomskih i psiholoških karakteristika građana na njihovu percepciju pripremljenosti navedenih subjekata sistema zaštite i spasavanja. Cilj kvantitativnog istraživanja predstavlja naučna eksplikacija uticaja navedenih faktora na percepciju pripremljenosti. U istraživanju sprovedenom u 19 lokalnih zajednica u Srbiji primenom strategije ispitivanja u domaćinstvima, višeetapnim slučajnim uzrokovanjem anketirano je 2.500 građana u toku 2015. godine. Rezultati istraživanja ukazuju da je ocena pripremljenosti za reagovanje najviša je kod domaćinstva (M = 3,03), a najniža kod organa jedinica lokalne samouprave (M = 2,86). Utvrđena je statistički značajna povezanost pola, godina starosti, visine prihoda i prethodnog iskustva sa percepcijom pripremljenosti domaćinstva. Sa druge strane, na percepciju pripremljenosti državnih organa statistički značajno utiču godine starosti, status zaposlenosti, visina prihoda i prethodno iskustvo. Posebno je značajno spomenuti da strah ispitanika od kriznih situacija ne utiče na percepciju pripremljenosti za reagovanje. Polazeći od empirijski neispitanog stanja percepcije pripremljenosti sistema zaštite i spasavanja za reagovanje rad poseduje visoki naučni i društveni značaj. Pri tome, rezultati istraživanja mogu biti iskorišćeni za unapređenje pripremljenosti takvog sistema.

The subject of quantitative research is examination of citizens perception of the risk of natural disaster caused by flood and their household vulnerability assessment. The independent samples T-test has examined the connection of gender, parenthood, employment, disability and previous experience whereas a single-factor analysis of variance has been used to examine the connection of age, level of education and marital status to perception of risk and household vulnerability assessment. The objective of the conducted research is the scientific explanation of the effect of the abovementioned variables. 2,500 citizens in 19 local communities have been questioned by the application of survey strategy in households and multiple random sampling. The results of the research show that 13.4% of the respondents emphasize that there may be flood in the following year, 28.9% of the respondents think that there may be flood in the following five years and 39.3% of the respondents emphasize that their household is threatened. The statistically significant connection between perception of risks, parenthood, previous experience, military obligation, age and marital status has been determined. Household vulnerability assessment is statistically greatly connected to parenthood, previous experience, military obligation, level of education and marital status. The results of the research can be used to raise awareness of risks from natural disasters caused by floods as the key precondition for improving their readiness to respond. ; Predmet kvantitativnog istraživanja predstavlja ispitivanje percepcije građana o riziku nastanka prirodne katastrofe izazvane poplavom i ocene ugroženosti njihovog domaćinstva. T-testom nezavisnih uzoraka ispitana je povezanost pola, roditeljstva, zaposlenosti, invaliditeta i prethodnog iskustva, dok je jednofaktorskom analizom varijanse ispitana povezanost godina starosti, nivoa obrazovanja i bračnog statusa sa percepcijom rizika i ocenom ugroženosti domaćinstva. Cilj sprovedenog istraživanja ogleda se u naučnoj eksplikaciji uticaja navedenih promenljivih. Primenom strategije ispitivanja u domaćinstvima i višeetapnim slučajnim uzorkovanjem anketirano je 2500 građana u 19 lokalnih zajednica. Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju da 13,4% ispitanika ističe da je verovatno da će doći do poplave u narednih godinu dana, 28,9% smatra da je verovatno da će doći do poplave u narednih pet godina i 39,3% ispitanika ističe da je ugroženo njihovo domaćinstvo. Utvrđena je statistički značajna povezanost između percepcije rizika, roditeljstva, prethodnog iskustva, vojne obaveze, godine starosti i bračnog statusa. Kada je reč o oceni ugroženosti domaćinstva ona je statistički znatno povezana sa roditeljstvom, prethodnim iskustvom, vojnom obavezom, nivoom obrazovanja i bračnim statusom. Rezultati istraživanja mogu biti iskorišćeni za podizanje nivoa svesti o rizicima od prirodnih katastrofa izazvanih poplavama kao ključni preduslov podizanja njihove spremnosti za reagovanje.

When it comes to legitimation and institutional structure, Berger and Luckmann's work remains relevant today despite its age. This paper is an attempt to explore what seems to be an unjustly underutilized approach – institutional analysis through legitimation. The first part presents the concept of legitimation and the role it plays in the construction and maintenance of institutions based on the book The Social Construction of Reality. The article argues that institutional analysis through legitimation provides us with knowledge of institutional structure and position as seen by members of society, hence bridging the gap between formal and informal institutions. In the second part, the main ideas are explored as a basis for research and cluster analysis, and a coherent theoretical and methodological approach is suggested. ; Kada su u pitanju legitimacija i institucionalna struktura rad Bergera i Lukmana je uprkos vremenu i danas relevantan. Ovaj rad je pokušaj da se istraže mogućnosti na prvi pogled nepravedno malo korišćenog pristupa institucionalnoj analizi – kroz legitimaciju. Prvi deo rada predstavlja u osnovnim crtama koncept legitimacije i ulogu koju igra u konstrukciji i održavanju institucija, na temeljima knjige Socijalna konstrukcija stvarnosti. Takođe se iznose argumenti da institucionalna analiza kroz legitimaciju predstavlja pristup znanju institucionalnih struktura i pozicija onako kako ih pripadnici društva vide, premošćavajući tako distancu između formalnih i neformalnih institucija. U drugom delu su obrađene ideje iskorišćene kao osnova za istraživanje i analizu korišćenjem klaster analize, te je predložen koherentni teorijsko-metodološki pristup.

Članak, napisan na osnovu jugoslovenskih arhivskih izvora i relevantne literature, predstavlja analizu stanja na jugoslovensko-rumunskoj granici od završetka Drugog svetskog rata do naglog pogoršanja odnosa dveju susednih zemalja posle objavljivanja Rezolucije Informbiroa juna 1948. godine. Prateći stanje bezbednosti na granici, pogranične incidente i funkcionisanje dvovlasničkog režima moguće je uočiti stav i politiku Jugoslavije prema Rumuniji i dešavanjima na njenoj političkoj sceni u periodu njenog preobražaja iz višestranačke monarhije u jednopartijsku republiku sovjetskog tipa.

Doktorska disertacija Jugoslovenska politika prema zemljama narodne demokratije u susedstvu 1953 – 1958. godine zasnovana je na jugoslovenskim arhivskim izvorima iz Arhiva Srbije i Crne Gore, Diplomatskog arhiva Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije i Vojnog arhiva kao i na relevantnoj domaćoj i stranoj literaturi. Disertacija se bavi jugoslovenskom politikom prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj u periodu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa ovim zemljama posle Staljinove smrti tj. posle petogodišnjeg perioda tokom koga su njihovi odnosi bili u gotovo potpunom prekidu. Ona predstavlja pokušaj da se sagleda odnos Jugoslavije prema neposrednom susedstvu u uslovima hladnog rata i sadejstva jugoslovenskih interesa sa jedne i spoljnih faktora poput uloge Sovjetskog Saveza u procesu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa pomenutim zemljama ili uloge vodećih zapadnih zemalja i njihovih interesa u Jugoslaviji i susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa druge strane. U nekoliko faza kroz koje su od marta 1953. do aprila 1958. godine prošli odnosi Jugoslavije sa Albanijom, Bugarskom, Rumunijom i Mađarskom (od Staljinove smrti do potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije, od potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije do XX kongresa KPSS-a, od XX kongresa KPSS-a do izbijanja događaja u Mađarskoj 1956. godine i od događaja u Mađarskoj do kritike novog Programa SKJ) jugoslovenska politika se menjala u skladu sa okolnostima zadržavajući kao konstante izražen interes za normalizaciju odnosa i insistiranje na tome da sve susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" javno osude svoju raniju politiku prema Jugoslaviji i rehabilituju sve koji su na montiranim sudskim procesima osuđeni zbog špijunske delatnost u korist Jugoslavije. Osnovni cilj rada na ovoj dioktorskoj disertaciji je bio da pruži nova znanja o ovoj temi, nove poglede na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku i ponudi novi ugao gledanja na odnose Jugoslavije sa SSSR-om i Varšavskim paktom u celini. U vezi sa tim definisan je i drugi cilj ovog rada koji se odnosi na rekonstrukciju jugoslovenske politike prema ovim zemljama i na pokušaj da se uoče specifičnosti, metode i ciljevi te politike koji su se razlikovali u odnosu na jugoslovensku politiku prema ostalim istočnoevropskim zemljama. Treći cilj na temu jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je i sistematizacija postojećih znanja o ovoj temi i njihova evaluacija s obzirom na veći stepen dostupnosti izvora nego što je to bio slučaj pre više decenija kada su nastali najznačajniji radovi koji su se delimično bavili pojedinim segmentima ove teme. Četvrti cilj istraživanja bio je utvrđivanje hronološki jasno određenih faza kroz koje su prolazili odnosi Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom, Rumunijom, Bugarskom i Albanijom u posmatranom periodu i identifikacija faktora koji su na to uticali. U trenutku Staljinove smrti, susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" bile su daleko od centra pažnje jugoslovenske spoljne politike jer je , između ostalog, i njihov značaj za nju u uslovima prekida međudržavnih odnosa bio mali. Međutim, promene koje su ubrzo posle Staljinove smrti usledile u Sovjetskom Savezu omogućile su početak normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije i "prve zemlje socijalizma" što je za sobom povuklo i mogućnost da Jugoslavija normalizuje svoje odnose i sa susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije". Kada su u pitanju bile te zemlje, primarni jugoslovenski interes nije se nalazio u sferi politike i ekonomije kao u slučaju Sovjetskog Saveza već u sferi praktičnih međudržavnih pitanja koja su teško opterećivala Jugoslaviju. Na prvom mestu to je bio interes da se što pre otkloni vojna pretnja na granicama i stanje na zajedničkoj "liniji razgraničenja" koje je u godinama posle 1948. iziskivalo velika materijalna i kadrovska ulaganja. Osim toga, Jugoslavija je jasan interes imala i po pitanju poboljšanja položaja pripadnika jugoslovenskih manjina u susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" kao i po pitanju normalizacije saobraćaja. Razlog što Jugoslavija nije pokazivala izražen interes za političku i ekonomsku saradnju sa ovim zemljama ležao je u činjenici da je ona u međuvremenu, u vreme godina sukoba, uspela da pronađe alternativu kako u sferi spoljne politike tako i u sferi ekonomije i na taj način obesmisli blokadu kojoj je bila izložena sa Istoka. Međutim, cena iznalaženja te alternative bila je visoka i pretila je da ugrozi monopol vlasti Saveza komunista Jugoslavije što je za Tita i njegovo najbliže okruženje bilo neprihvatljivo. Iz tog razloga, mogućnost da se nađe zajednički jezik sa Moskvom predstavljao je za Tita priliku da uspostavi ravnotežu kada je u pitanju bio jugoslovenski položaj prema suprotstavljenim blokovima u zaoštrenoj hladnoratovskoj atmosferi. Odnos Jugoslavije prema SSSR-u, i obrnuto, može se smatrati jednim od najznačajnijih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa jedne i na kreiranje politike koje su sve istočnoevropske zemlje vodile prema Jugoslaviji sa druge strane. Drugi značajan faktor koji je uticao na jugoslovensku politiku prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je u tesnoj vezi sa jugoslovensko-sovjetskim odnosima a ticao se prevashodno ideologije i s tim u vezi destaljinizacije. Kreirajući u godinama sukoba sa Informbiroom sopstveni model "samoupravnog" socijalizma, Jugoslavija tokom procesa normalizacije odnosa nije pristajala na "jedinstvo lagera" i povratak u njega što je bio glavni kamen spoticanja u njenim odnosima kakao sa SSSR-om tako i sa drugim istočnoevropskim zemljama pa i susednim kao što su bile Albanija, Bugarska, Mađarska i Rumunija. S tim u vezi je i destaljinizacija, odnosno njen napredak i dubina u susednim "zemljama" narodne demokratije kao i njihova spremnost da se distanciraju od staljinističke ideologije, predstavljala jedan od glavnih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema tim zemljama. Najzad, važan činilac koji je uticao na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku uopšte pa i na njenu politiku prema delu ili celini Istočnog bloka bili su i njeni odnosi sa Zapadom, koji su iz pragmatičnih razloga tokom godina sukoba sa Informbiroom bili poboljšani do te mere da su Jugoslaviju, iako nevoljno, doveli na rub uključenja u zapadni vojni savez. Zapad je bio taj kome se nije dopadalo jugoslovensko približavanje SSSR-u i istočnoevropskim zemljama i u periodu normalizacije njihovih odnosa svaki korak koji je vodio približavanju dveju do tada suprotstavljenih strana izazivao je na Zapadu sumnje u iskrenost Jugoslavije i zebnju kada je u pitanju bila budućnost odnosa Zapada i Jugoslavije. Kao rezultat sadejstva nekoliko najvažnijih spoljnih faktora i jugoslovenskih interesa u neposrednom susedstvu iz okvira socijalističkog "lagera" nastajala je jugoslovenska politika prema Istoku uopšte pa i prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj ponaosob, onakva kakva je bila. U periodu od 1953. do 1958. godine ta politika je bila aktivna i pozitivna ali ne i bez ograda. Tih godina, Jugoslavija je bez sumnje pokazivala interes da normalizuje svoje odnose sa susedima sa kojima je osim granice delila i ideologiju ali najčešće nije želela da ona bude ta koja će dati inicijativu za konkretne korake u tom procesu. Smatrajući da su međusobni odnosi narušeni ne njenom već krivicom suseda, ona je strogo poštovala načelo (koje je inače zastupala i kada je u pitanju bila njena politika prema SSSR-u) da prvi korak treba da učini onaj koji je odgovoran za prekid normalnih dobrosusedskih odnosa. Imajući u vidu sve interese, želje i aspiracije koje je Jugoslavija imala kada je u pitanju bio prostor neposredno uz njene granice kao i faktore koji su neminovno uticali na njenu politiku, može se reći da je Jugoslavija prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu u periodu normalizacije međusobnih odnosa od 1953. do 1958. godine vodila politiku mogućeg. Ta politika, međutim, iako osmišljena na isti način, nije uvek bila ista prema svakoj pojedinačnoj zemlji u susedstvu iz prostog razloga što u njima nije nailazila na istovetne uslove i mogućnosti. Tamo gde su mogućnosti bile veće, Jugoslavija je postizala više. Međutim, kako je vreme odmicalo i kako je Jugoslavija bivala sve uspešnija u pronalaženju svog sopstvenog "trećeg puta", čini se da joj je sve manje i manje bilo stalo do sadržajnije saradnje sa većinom suseda od kojih je (budući da su sve bile deo Istočnog bloka), u skladu sa svojom novom spoljnopolitičkom strategijom koja je ekvidistancu prema blokovima predviđala kao imperativ, trebalo da napravi određeni otklon. ; The Ph.D. thesis Yugoslav Policy Towards the Neighboring Countries of People's Democracy 1953-1958 is based on Yugoslav archival sources from the Archives of Yugoslavia, the Diplomatic Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Serbia and the Military Archives, as well as on the relevant domestic and foreign literature. The thesis deals with Yugoslav policy towards Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary during the period of normalization of relations between these countries and Yugoslavia after Stalin's death, i.e. after a five years' period of almost complete interruption in bilateral relations. It is an attempt at a study of the interplay of Yugoslavia's relations with immediate neighborhood during the Cold War and Yugoslav interests on the one hand, and interests of foreign factors, such as the Soviet Union and the leading Western nations in Yugoslavia and in the neighboring countries within the framework of the normalization of Yugoslavia's relations with the above mentioned countries. During the several phases the Yugoslav relations with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary went through between March 1953 and April 1958 (from Stalin's death until the signing of the Belgrade Declaration, from then to the 20th congress of the CP of the USSSR, from then until the beginning of the events in Hungary in 1956 and from then until the critique of the new Program of the CP of Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav policy changed in accordance with the situation, preserving the interest in normalizing relations and insisting that all neighboring countries of "people's democracy" should condemn their former policy towards Yugoslavia and rehabilitate all those who had been sentenced as Yugoslav spies at show trials. The main goal of this Ph.D. thesis was to provide new knowledge of the topic, new views on Yugoslav foreign policy and to propose a new vantage point on the Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union, and on relations with the Warsaw Pact as a whole. Connected with this was another goal of the thesis that concrens the reconstruction of Yugoslav policy toward these countries and the attempt to pinpoint the characteristics, methods and goals of that policy that were different from those of Yugoslav policy toward other east European countries. The third goal of the topic of Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" between 1953 and 1958 was also to systematize the existing knowledge on the subject in view of better accessability of sources as compared with the situation of several decades ago when the most important works touching upon some aspects of this topic were written. The fourth goal of the research was to determin chronologically clearly defined phases that the Yugoslav relations with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania had gone through during the researched period and to identify the factors that influenced the process. At the time of Stalin's death the countries of "people's democracy" were far from the focus of the Yugoslav foreign policy, because, among other things, their importance was small due to the severed inter-state relations. However, the changes that set in the Soviet Union soon after Stalin's death made the beginning of normalization of relations with the "first country of socialism" possible. This entailed the possibility that Yugoslavia also normalizes its relations with neighboring countries of "people's democracy". When these countries were in question, Yugoslavia's primary interest didn't lie in political or economic spheres as in the case of the Soviet Union, but rather in the sphere of practical inter-state matters weighting heavily on Yugoslavia. Supreme was the interest to do away as soon as possible with the military threat on the borders and to change the situation on the "line of demarcation" that had required much material and human resources in the years after 1948. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had a clear interest in improving the situation of members of Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy", as well as in normalization of trafic. The reason why Yugoslavia showed no great interest in political or economic cooperation with these countries lay in the fact that she had in the meantime, during the years of conflict, found alternative solutions in the spheres of foreign policy and economy, reducing thus to insignifficance the blocade imposed on her from the East. However, the price of that alternative solution was high and it threatened to endanger the power monopoly of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia, which was unacceptable for Tito and his innermost circle of collaborators. For that reason, the possibility of finding common grounds with Moscow was for Tito an oportunity to balance Yugoslavia's position between the two competing blocs in a worsened Cold War atmosphere. Yugoslavia's relation to the USSSR and vice versa, can be seen as one of the most important factors influencing Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" on the one hand, and on the other, one that was decisively shaping their policy towards Yugoslavia. Another important factor influencing Yugoslav policy toward the countries of "people's democracy" in the vicinity between 1953 and 1958 was closely connected with the Yugoslav-Soviet relations and it concerned primarily ideology and, in that context, destalinization. Having created her own model of "self-managing" socialism during the years of conflict with the Cominform, during the process of normalization Yugoslavia didn't accept the unity of the Eastern Bloc and the matter of her return to it was one of the main stumbling blocks both in her relations with the USSR and with the neighbors such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. In that context, destalinisation, i.e. its progress and depth in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" and their willingnes to distance themselves from the Stalinist ideology was one of the major factors influencing Yugoslavia's policy toward those countries. Finally, the important factor influencing Yugoslav foreign policy in general, including part of the Eastern Block or it as a whole, were Yugoslavia's relations with the West that had been so improved during the years of conflict with the Cominform, that they led Yugoslavia, although unwillingly, to the brink of joining the western military alliance. The West was unhappy with Yugoslav rapprochement with the USSR and eastern European countries and every step that brought closer the two once confonted parties during the process of normalization of their relations, caused the West to doubt Yugoslavia's sincerety and cause fears for the future relations between the West and Yugoslavia. As a result of interplay of several major foreign political factors and Yugoslav interests in the imediate socialist block neighborhood, the Yugoslav policy toward the East in general and toward Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary individually, emerged in the given form. Between 1953 and 1958 that policy was active and positive, but not without restrains. During those years Yugoslavia clearly showed interest in normalizing her relations with the neighboring countries with whom she shared not only borders, but ideology too, but in most cases she was not willing to be the one to initiate concrete steps in that process. Deeming that it had not been her fault but that of her neighbors that the bilateral relations had been spoiled, she observed strictly the principle (that she also championed in her relations with the USSR) that the side that had been responsible for the interruption of normal good neighborly relations should also make the first move. Having in mind all the interests, wishes and aspirations that Yugoslavia had concerning the space imediatly bordering on her territory as well as the factors necessarily infuencing her policy, it can be said that Yugoslavia led the policy of what was possible toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" during tthe period of normalization of bilateral relations 1953-1958. However, that policy wasn't always the same toward all these neighboring countries, for simple reason that it didn't meet with the same conditions and possibilities in them. Where possibilities were greater, Yugoslavia acheived more. However, as the time went by and as Yugoslavia became increasingly more successful in finding her own "third way", it seems she was increasingly less interested in substantial cooperation with most of the neighbors from whom (since they were all members of the Eastern Block) certain distance should be kept – in keeping with the new foreign political strategy that foresaw equidistance towards both blocs as a must.

NATO's political and - above all - military participation in secession-motivated conflicts in former Yugoslavia (1990-1995), will be remembered as a clear example of demonstration of power, intentions and (in)capability of the Victor in a decades-long global "cold war" between the "freedom-loving" West and "totalitarian East". Regardless of the expectations of liberal theoreticians and the majority of public opinion, it was soon revealed that the victory was no "triumph of freedom" and even less "the end of history". On the contrary, as historically typical, it was only an unstable resultant of relations between major actors in the modern global theater, who strive to legitimize their need for domination with varying success and vocabulary. Hence the lessons to be learned from the final act of destruction of Yugoslavia (several months of NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999) have the expected tone of banality: absolute might strives for absolute power (which remains unattainable in principle); "the mighty oppress" is true always and in any place (but with a time limit); and, finally, what everyone knows but does not (or is unable or refuses) to say aloud: the only true alternative to military threat and/or aggression of a single political actor is an equally valid (military) threat/aggression by another one. We are tempted to conclude that, despite the ideological ardor of NGO activists, the political correctness of theoreticians and the rhetorical figures of speech of politicians, the "banalities" remain valid as the only certainties, i.e., regularities in the unpredictable currents of relations between states.

The article presents a critical overview of underlying ideas, social context, and original teachings of two "mediating ideologies" (social democracy and conservatism) and two mass "political phenomena" (nationalism and populism). Each of them constitutes a form of more or less effective political compromise, which ought to neutralize constant tensions and clashes between the leading modern ideologies of freedom and equality, i.e. liberalism and communism. However, the clash of ideologies which were prominent in the 19th and 20th centuries has lost much of its intensity today, although the social causes that gave rise to them have remained unchanged: social inequalities, abuse of freedom, and uneven distribution of social power. At the same time, the main social forces and political organizations that had been the symbols and striking forces of freedom and equality in the preceding decades - the political parties of the "left " and "right", including the never clearly defined "political center" - also lost their identity and power. Th e then political mortal enemies look and behave today almost exactly as they did then: in the ideological sense, "everyone wants everything" (allegedly representing/ defending the interests of "all citizens"); in the organizational sense, there is almost no difference between them; whereas the difference in the manner they behave when in power is almost negligible.

Seen from a historical point of view, security and defense have always been tasks mostly dealt with by state institutions (police, armed forces and intelligence services). The state's monopoly over the instruments of force has visibly 'weakened' in the past two decades, largely as a result of the privatization trend permeating all areas of modern society. After the end of the Cold War, private military companies have started to extensively provide professional military services, both to developing countries and industrialized countries. These services range from strategic, tactical and technological advice, training and logistical support, to providing exclusively military (combat) services to governments of various countries, multinational corporations, international organizations, non-government agencies and other non-state actors. Private military companies are certainly not a transient phenomenon or occurrence; on the contrary, they will be very important providers of private military services in the future. In this regard, the paper generally and systematically examines the role of private military companies and armed forces, in the traditional concepts of both national and international security, with special overview of their historical development. ; Posmatrano sa istorijskog aspekta, bezbednost i odbrana odu- vek su bili zadaci kojima su se, uglavnom, bavile državne institucije (policija, vojska i obaveštajne službe). Monopol države nad instrumentima sile vidno je 'oslabio' u protekle dve decenije, najviše kao rezultat trenda privatizacije koji je zahvatio sve oblasti modernog društva. Nakon završetka hladnog rata privatne vojne kompanije u velikoj meri počele su da pružaju profesionalne vojne usluge, kako zemljama u razvoju, tako i industrijski razvijenim zemljama. Te usluge variraju od strateških, taktičkih i tehnoloških saveta, obuke i logističke podrške, kao i pružanja isključivo vojnih (borbenih) usluga vladama raznih država, multinacionalnim korporacijama, međunarodnim organizacijama, nevladinim agencijama i ostalim nedržavnim subjektima. Privatne vojne kompanije svakako nisu neki prolazni fenomen ili pojava; naprotiv, one će predstavljati veoma važnog snabdevača privatnih vojnih usluga u budućnosti. U vezi s tim, u radu se na jedan generalni i sistematski način sagledava uloga privatnih vojnih kompanija i oružanih snaga, kako u tradicionalnim konceptima nacionalne, tako i međunarodne bezbednosti sa posebnim osvrtom na njihov istorijski razvoj.

All member states of the European Union have the Integrated protection and rescue system with 'SOS 112' system, and today this is a technical requirement for countries that are seeking to become the EU members. Although this system is regulated by the Law on Emergency Situations (2009) and National strategy (2011), it has not been implemented in the Republic of Serbia. In this article the authors analyze the importance and benefits of this system and the main reason why it is not implemented so far.